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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

Appellant Shane Crawford submits the following in support of his Petition for Review.
A.

Why Review Should be Granted

Review should be granted under I.A.R. 118(b)(4) because the Court of Appeals has
unreasonably determined that testimony that Mr. Crawford touched his daughter "[o]utside of
[her] vaginal area" was sufficient to establish that Mr. Crawford engaged in manual-genital
touching during his trial on a charge of lewd conduct against a minor. As a result of that error, the
Comi of Appeals erroneously found that trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective for failing
to challenge the sufficiency of that evidence.
In addition, it has erroneously found that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to
object to the trial court's inadequate response to a jury inquiry. This ruling is in conflict with
another opinion of the Court of Appeals, namely the opinion issued in Mr. Crawford's direct
l •
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appeal where the Court of Appeals reversed a different count based upon a similar instruction
error. State v. Crawford, Docket No. 38787 at 3 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, review of this issue
should be granted under I.A.R. 118(b)(3). A true and correct copy of State v. Crawford, supra is
attached hereto as Exhibit A. A true and correct copy of the Court of Appeals opinion in this case
is attached as Exhibit B.
B.

Procedural History and Statement of Facts

1.

Introduction

Shane Crawford was charged in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2010-7100 with two counts
of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under Sixteen ("Counts I and II") and two counts of Sexual
Abuse of a Child Under Sixteen. (CR 5.) Mr. Crawford entered not guilty pleas to the four
charges and was represented at trial by attorney Matt Roker. (Id) He was found guilty by a jury
of the two lewd conduct counts and not guilty of the two sexual abuse counts. He was sentenced
to concurrent sentences of twenty-five-years with six years fixed on each count. (CR 4-5.)

2.

Testimony at the trial

The state's first witness was As.C. She was the alleged victim in Count I. As.C. testified
that she is Mr. Crawford's daughter and that in 2009 she was living in a home with him and the
rest of her family. (T pg. 196, ln. 1 -pg. 198, ln. 5.) 1 A few months before July of 2009, As.C.
and Mr. Crawford were watching a movie while laying on the couch in the living room. (T pg.
198, In. 6 - pg. 199, ln. 19.) As.C. testified that while lying on the couch, Mr. Crawford "started
reaching up my shirt and groping my breasts and then he started going down into my panties and
began touching my vagina." (T pg. 199, In. 21 - 25.) As.C. elaborated that Mr. Crawford's hand
Mr. Crawford attached a copy of the trial transcript to his petition and asked that the
court take judicial notice of it. (CR 11, 257.) The court granted the motion. (Transcript Post
Conviction Proceedings (8/7/2013) pg. 11, ln. 12-16.)
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was over her bra feeling her breasts and that "he was feeling down into my crotch area." (T pg.
200, ln. 12 -pg. 201, In. 7.) As.C. thought the entire event lasted about 30 minutes and when "he
was going onto my vagina" she left to go play video games upstairs. (T pg. 201, ln. 18-25.)
The next witness was Tracy Crawford, Mr. Crawford's ex-wife. (T pg. 218, ln. 7 -pg.
219, ln. 3.) Ms. Crawford testified about the family relationships and the divorce, and was
allowed to testify about both An.C. and As.C. making disclosures to her regarding being sexually
touched by Mr. Crawford. (T pg. 218, ln. 12 -pg. 234, ln. 6.)
An.C. was the next witness. An.C. was the victim in Count II. An.C. testified that she is
also Mr. Crawford's daughter. (T pg. 238, ln. 8-16.) She claimed that when she was in 8th grade,
Mr. Crawford offered her an alcoholic drink and asked her if she knew what a clit was. (T pg.
242, ln. 17-18.) An.C. responded that she "did not know what that was." Id. An.C. then testified
that "He said, 'Well let me show you,' and then was going to show me and I, like, backed away
when he was going to show me." (T pg. 243, ln. 10-12.) When the prosecutor asked "So, did his
hand touch you?", An.C. responded "Yeah." (T pg. 243, ln. 10-16.) But when asked "Where did
he touch you?", An.C. testified, "Outside ofmy vaginal area." (T pg. 243, ln. 15-16.)
The state argued to the jury and later confirmed to the Court that the "clit incident" was the
incident which constituted Count II. (T pg. 498, ln. 5-14; pg. 545, In. 8 - pg. 546, In. 6.)
On another occasion, when An.C. was about 13 years old, she was on the couch with Mr.
Crawford and he was rubbing her leg up toward her privates, outside of her bikini line. (T pg.
244, In. 20- pg. 245, In. 21.) Around Christmas of 2008, Mr. Crawford allegedly pulled out his
penis and tried to show it to An.C., but she looked away. (T pg. 248, In. 24 - pg. 251, In. 11.) At
a party, Mr. Crawford allegedly grabbed An.C.'s breast in front of others in a joking way.
251, In. 12
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Cf pg.

Crawford began rubbing An.C.'s stomach and moving his hand toward her shirt; she kept batting
it away before he could touch any private areas. (T pg. 254, ln. 1 -pg. 257, ln. 2.)
The state then presented the testimony of the detective assigned the case and a counselor
specializing in counseling sexually abused children. (T pg. 274, ln. 22- pg. 335, ln. 7.) The
state's last witness was Sharon Crawford, Mr. Crawford's mother, who noted that the girls had
disclosed that Mr. Crawford had been touching them in a way that made them uncomfortable, but
saw nothing sexual about the touching they reported. (T pg. 346, ln. 1-16; pg. 351, ln. 22-pg.
352, ln. 4.)
Mr. Crawford called his son, Nolan Crawford. (T pg. 405, ln. 5-12.) Nolan testified that

his father had a good relationship with his family, that he knew that An.C. had walked in on her
father in states of undress in the bathroom and had walked in on her parents having sex. (T pg.
407, ln. 8-pg. 413, ln.19; pg. 415, ln. 18-pg. 416, ln. 4.) George Crawford, his other son,
testified similarly. (T pg. 429, ln. 1 - pg. 435, ln. 18.) The defense then rested. (T pg. 462, ln.
6-7.)
The state then recalled An.C. who testified that she had walked in on her parents having
sex in their bathroom. (T pg. 465, ln. 3 - pg. 467, ln. 5.) The state then rested. (T pg. 469, ln. 4.)
No I.C.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal was made by defense counsel. The jury found him
guilty on the two Lewd Conduct counts and not guilty on the two Sexual Abuse Counts. (CR 8.)
Mr. Crawford appealed. (CR 5.) Elizabeth Allred of the State Appellate Public
Defender's Office represented Mr. Crawford on appeal. (Id.) On June 27, 2012, the Court of
Appeals vacated the conviction on Count I, but affirmed on Count II and also affirmed the
sentence with respect to Count II. State v. Crawford, supra (Exhibit A). The Court of Appeals
vacated Count I because the trial court failed to adequately answer the second part of jury inquiry
4 •
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#3: "Does touching of the breast area constitute manual-genital contact?" The Court of Appeals
found that the court's failure to clarify that the breast was not a genital for purposes of the lewd
conduct statute was error, but also that only Count I involved an incident where there were
allegations of breast touching. Thus, the error was harmless as to Count II.
The Remittitur in the appeal was filed in the district court on August 23, 2012. (CR 6.) On
September 14, 2012, the state moved to dismiss Count I. On October 3, 2012, the district court
granted the motion to dismiss, leaving only the judgment and sentence as to Count II remaining.
(CR6.)
3.

Proceedings upon post-conviction petition

On July 2, 2013, Mr. Crawford filed a petition for post-conviction relief as to Count II
alleging that his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective. (CR 4.) He alleged that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a judgment of acquittal under I.C.R. 29(a) due to
insufficiency of the evidence as to Count II. He alleged that there was insufficient evidence to
support the conviction on Count II as a matter oflaw because An.C. did not testify that Mr.
Crawford touched her genitalia and the state did not present any other evidence that Mr. Crawford
touched An.C.'s genitalia at that time. (CR 6-10.)
He also alleged that trial counsel was ineffective during jury deliberations. Mr. Crawford
alleged that trial counsel's performance was deficient because a reasonably competent attorney
would have requested that the Court answer "yes" in response to the first part of the jury's
question: "In order to have committed manual-genital contact, does it require touching the vaginal
area?" or have asked the court to define the word "genital." He also alleged that trial counsel's
deficient perfonnance prejudiced Mr. Crawford because, had the court instructed the jury on the
definition of "genital," or instructed the jury that it had to find that Mr. Crawford manually
5 •
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touched the vaginal area of As.C. (in Count I) and/or An.C. (in Count II), the jury would have
acquitted Mr. Crawford of Count II because there was no evidence of manual-genital touching to
support a conviction on that count. (CR 9-10.)
Mr. Crawford also alleged that he was prejudiced because appellate counsel could not
raise the issue of whether the trial court should have instructed the jury as to the definition of
"genital" or that it should have instructed the jury that it had to find that Mr. Crawford manually
touched the vaginal area of A.C. (in Count I) and/or An.C. (in Count II) because trial counsel
failed to preserve that issue for appeal. Had the issue been preserved for appeal, the Court of
Appeals would have reversed the conviction on Count II due to the trial court's jury instruction
error. (CR 10.)
Finally, Mr. Crawford alleged that appellate counsel's performance was deficient because
a reasonably competent appellate attorney would have raised a sufficiency of the evidence claim
as to Count II given the insufficiency of proof, especially as there were not stronger issues to raise
on appeal as to Count II. He also alleged appellate counsel's deficient performance prejudiced
Mr. Crawford because had she raised an insufficiency of the evidence challenge as to Count II on
appeal, the Court of Appeals would have vacated the conviction and ordered that a judgment of
acquittal enter as to that count. (CR 11.)
In support of the petition, Mr. Crawford attached as Exhibits the trial transcripts, the
Appellant's and Respondent's Briefs in the direct appeal and the Court of Appeals' unpublished
opinion. (CR 11.) The Court later took judicial notice of the trial transcripts. (TPCP (8/7/2013)
pg. 12, In. 12-16.)
The state filed an Answer and a Motion for Summary Disposition. (CR 266, 278.) Mr.
Crawford filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition. (CR 281.) After briefing and a
6 •
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hearing, the court denied Mr. Crawford's motion, granted the state's motion and dismissed the
case. (CR 323, 337.)
A timely notice of appeal was filed. (CR 339.) On March 24, 2014, a Corrected Final
Judgment was filed by the district court.
C.

The Court ofAppeals Erred in Finding Trial and Appellate Counsels' Pe,formances
Were Not Deficient and There Was Insufficient Evidence in the Trial Record to
Support the Conviction on Count II

A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the right to counsel on appeal. Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of

that counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; LC.§ 19-852.
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance;
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id. An
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is judged under the standards set forth in
Strickland See e.g., 1vfintun v. State, 144 Idaho at 658, 168 P.3d at 42.
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The Due Process Clauses of the United States and State Constitutions preclude conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which a defendant is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
In short, Winship presupposes as an essential of the due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment that no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a
criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof-defined as evidence necessary to
convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element
of the offense.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,316 (1979). In the case where a properly instructed jury has
convicted, even though no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
that conviction cannot constitutionally stand. Jackson, 443 U.S., pg. 318. According to the U.S.
Supreme Court: "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S., pg. 319.
1.

Trial counsel

Trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to move for a judgment of acquittal as to
Count II.
Here is the testimony from An.C regarding Count II:
Q. And so do you remember a time when you were in the kitchen with your dad?
A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So what were you doing in the kitchen?
A. He was offering me an alcoholic drink and I told him I didn't want any alcohol.

And I don't know how the conversation got brought up, but he asked me what a
clit was and I told him I didn't know what that was.
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Q. And then what did he do?
A. He said, Well, let me show you," and then went to show me, and I, like, backed
away when he was going to show me.
Q. Okay. So did his hands touch you?

A. Yeah.
Q. Where did they touch you?
A. Outside of my vaginal area.
(T pg. 242, ln. 3 - pg. 243, ln. 16.) After her testimony about being touched outside of her vaginal
area, An.C testified as follows:
Q. Okay. So was he going down, like down from your shorts or was he going up?
A. Up.
(T pg. 243, ln. 13-19.)
An.C. testified that Mr. Crawford was reaching up her shorts and he touched outside her
vaginal area. It makes sense that he was not able to reach her vaginal area in light of An.C's
testimony that she "backed away when he was going to show me." (T pg. 243, In. 11-12.)
However, being touched "outside of my vaginal area" is not sufficient to prove the allegation in
Count II, which alleged manual-genital touching. (CR 67).
An.C's trial testimony that she was touched outside of her vaginal area is corroborated by
her prior statements to Detective Ellis. The detective testified:
Q. Yeah, on the day that the alcohol use was involved. I believe there was an
allegation by [An.C] that the father had brought up the issue of do you know what
a clit is.

A. CoITect.
Q. Do you remember that?

9 •
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A. Right. That was the day in the kitchen where he -Q. Yes.
A. Yes
Q. And did [AC] [verbatim] tell you what her response was when she indicated
that her father had made a quick move toward her to show her what a clit was?
A. Yes, she indicated that he had reached his hand up the pant leg of her shorts.
Q. Okay.
A. He was trying to get her - get his hand inside of her underwear and she stepped
away from him and told him no.
(T pg. 284, ln. 24 - pg. 285, ln. 18.) (Emphasis added.) An.C did not tell Detective Ellis that she
was touched on her vaginal area. An.C told the detective that Mr. Crawford touched under her
pant leg in an attempt to get his hand inside her underwear, but she avoided that contact by
stepping away. An.C's prior statement confirms her trial testimony that she was touched outside
of her vaginal area.
There was insufficient evidence to support Count II because the state did not produce any
evidence that Mr. Crawford touched the genitals of An.C. during the "clit incident." The evidence
was only that he touched outside of her vaginal area. Consequently, it was ineffective assistance
of trial counsel to fail to move the court for a judgment of acquittal under I. C.R. 29.
When An.C. testified she was touched outside of her vaginal area she was testifying that
she was not touched on her genitalia. An.C. never claimed there was penetration of her genitalia,
which would be required in order to touch her vagina, consequently, the state was required to
prove manual touching of An.C. 's external genitalia. This required the state to prove that Mr.
Crawford touched An.C. 's "vaginal area," where the external female genitalia is located. But all it
proved was that he touched her "outside [her] vaginal area," i.e., not on her vaginal area, but
IO • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

elsewhere, e.g., the inner or upper thigh, leg, or hip. Being touched outside the vaginal area
cannot constitute manual-genital touching and the trial court's conclusion that the state's evidence
was sufficient is erroneous. As all the external female genitalia is within the vaginal area, manual
touching of An.C's vaginal area is a fact the state needed to, but did not, prove at trial.
Since a Rule 29 motion would have or should have been granted at trial, it was deficient
performance for trial counsel to not make the motion.
2.

Appellate counsel

Appellate counsel was also ineffective because she failed to raise the sufficiency of the
evidence claim as to Count II on appeal. The trial court, however, dismissed the appellate counsel
claim reasserting that "the evidence gave rise to reasonable inferences of guilt on Count II." (CR
334.) The court's argument in this regard fails for the reasons set forth above.
Appellate counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial because had the sufficiency of
evidence issue been raised on appeal, the Court of Appeals would have vacated the conviction and
remanded the case for the entry of a judgment of acquittal.
3.

The Court of Appeals' majority opinion on the sufficiency of the evidence issue

The majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. Chief Judge Gutierrez
dissented. The two judge majority first found that trial counsel and appellate counsel did not err
by failing to argue the evidence was insufficient to prove Count II finding the evidence to be
sufficient.
To prove lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen, the state must prove that
the defendant engaged in "any lewd or lascivious act or acts," which includes
manual-genital contact, and that such was "done with the intent of arousing,
appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person,
such minor child, or third party." LC.§ 18-1508. Crawford argues that the only
evidence supporting a finding that there was manual-genital contact between him
and Victim II was her testimony. However, Crawford contends that Victim II did
11 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

not directly testify that he touched her genitals. During direct examination by the
state, Victim II testified as follows:
Q: Okay. And so let's go back to the touching. Besides touching when he was rubbing your
leg, was he getting close to where your underwear was at?
A:Yes.
Q: In fact, was he up there to your privates?
A:Yes.
Q: And so do you remember a time when you were in the kitchen with your dad?
A:Yes.
Q: Can you kind of tell the jurors a little bit about when that was.
A: When it was?
Q: About how old you were.
A: I was in 8th grade ....
Q: Okay. So what were you doing in the kitchen?
A: He was offering me an alcoholic drink and I had told him that I didn't want any alcohol.
And I don't know how the conversation got brought up, but he asked me what a clit was
and I told him that I didn't know what that was.
Q: And then what did he do?
A: He said, "Well, let me show you," and then went to go show me, and I, like, backed
away when he was going to show me.
Q: Okay. So did his hands touch you?
A: Yeah.
Q: Where did they touch you?
A: Outside of my vaginal area.
Q: Okay. So was he going down, like down from your shorts or was he going up?
A:Up.
(Emphasis added.) According to Crawford, the statement that he touched "outside
of [her] vaginal area" can only be interpreted to mean that Crawford had not
touched Victim II's genitalia, but had instead touched outside of her genital area.
We disagree. Victim II's statement that Crawford touched her "outside of [her]
vaginal area" does not demand a conclusion that Crawford did not engage in
manual-genital contact. It is the province of the jury to determine what the witness
meant by the ambiguous phrase "outside of [her] vaginal area," and we will not
substitute our view for that of the jury as to the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at I 04, 822 P .2d at I 00 I; Decker, 108
Idaho at 684, 701 P.2d at 304.
Substantial evidence may exist even when the evidence presented is solely
circumstantial or when there is conflicting evidence. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho
694,712,215 P.3d 414,432 (2009); State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 50-51, 454 P.2d
945, 947-48 (1969). Even when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted
12 •
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consistently with a finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty
verdict when it also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt. Severson, 147
Idaho at 712,215 P.3d at 432; State v. Slawson, 124 Idaho 753, 757, 864 P.2d 199,
203 (Ct. App. 1993).
Such is the case here. The jury could have reasonably interpreted Victim II's
statement that Crawford touched her "outside of [her] vaginal area" to mean,
among other things, that Crawford had touched the external genitalia outside of her
vagina or touched the area surrounding her genitalia (as Crawford proposes). As
noted by the district court, the jury had the opportunity to observe Victim II's
demeanor as she testified and take note of her reluctance to describe what
happened to her. Moreover, not only did Victim II testify that Crawford touched
her "outside of [her] vaginal area," but she also responded affirmatively to the
question that he was "up there to [her] privates." This response was given without
reference to any specific event. However, it did follow a discussion regarding prior
touching of Victim II's upper thigh that had made her uncomfortable and
immediately preceded the discussion of the incident in the kitchen comprising
Count II. Moreover, the kitchen incident is the only incident to which an assertion
that Crawford had touched "up there to [Victim II's] privates" would logically
correlate, as all other incidents to which she testified involved him touching her
"upper thigh," "close to [her] private area," or "outside of [her] bikini line." A jury
could have reasonably understood this affirmation by Victim II that Crawford had
touched "up there to [her] privates" as referencing the single count for which the state was arguing
that such manual-genital contact had occurred. Thus, the circumstantial evidence in the record,
although subject to differing interpretations,
supports a reasonable inference of guilt consistent with the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we hold
that there was substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the
essential elements of lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen, including manual-genital
contact, were proven beyond a reasonable doubt in this case.

Crawford v. State, Exhibit B, pg. 6-9.
4.

Why review should be granted

Chief Judge Gutierrez sets out why review should be granted in his dissent. He writes
that:
Important to today's post-conviction appeal is Victim II's testimony at the criminal
trial. Rather than beginning with the incident at issue in Count II-the underlying
count for this post-conviction appeal-the prosecutor began with general questions
about Crawford's touching of Victim II. Specifically, Victim II testified that before
she was thirteen (2006 or earlier) and after she was thirteen (2006 and later), she
was touched by Crawford and that she became uncomfortable with Crawford's
touching at around age thirteen. Victim II explained that Crawford would touch her
"on [her] upper thigh," and "[ c]lose to [her] private area." Crawford, according to
13 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

Victim II, was getting close to where her underwear was at, and in fact was up
there to her privates.
After eliciting this general testimony from Victim II, the prosecutor moved on and
proceeded to ask Victim II about the kitchen incident, the subject of Count II.
Victim II explained that she was in the kitchen at her home and was wearing
pajama shorts and a tank top. According to Victim II, Crawford offered her
alcohol, which she refused, but during the discussion in the kitchen, Crawford
asked Victim II if she knew what a "clit" (clitoris) was. After she responded that
she did not know what a clitoris was, Victim II explained Crawford's actions:
[Victim II]: He said, "Well, let me show you," and then went to go show me, and I,
like, backed away when he was going to show me.
[The prosecutor]: Okay. So did his hands touch you?
[Victim II]: Yeah.
[The prosecutor]: Where did they touch you?
[Victim II]: Outside of my vaginal area.
[The prosecutor]: Okay. So was he going down, like down from your shorts or was
he going up?
[Victim II]: Up.
[The prosecutor]: Did you-<lid you make any comments to him?
[Victim II]: I just told him that I was going to bed and I went upstairs and just went
straight to bed.
Following Victim H's testimony regarding the kitchen incident, the prosecutor
moved on to another incident that occurred while Victim II and Crawford were
watching television. This incident was offered with regard to Count IV, as best can
be gleaned from the closing argument. In her testimony, Victim II explained that
Crawford and she would be on the couch, that Crawford would pull a blanket out
and put it over the two of them, and that Crawford would start rubbing her upper
thigh. She clarified that Crawford would begin at the knee area and move upward,
toward her "privates" and just "outside of [her] bikini line." The prosecutor, while
questioning about this incident, also asked, "At some point did you remove his
hand from around your vaginal area or from near your vaginal area?" Victim II
said, "Yeah."
The prosecutor then shifted gears to an incident in December 2008, near Christmas,
that was the basis for Count III. During this December 2008 incident, Crawford
showed Victim II his penis and asked her to look at it. Following Victim II's
testimony, the prosecutor went on to another incident at a television sports party in
which Crawford, in front of guests, grabbed Victim II's left breast (presumably,
over her clothing) and exclaimed, in a joking manner according to Victim II, that
she was "growing boobs." This incident, like the television incident, was also
offered in support of Count IV, based upon the prosecutor's closing argument. The
last incident brought out by the prosecutor also was in support of Count IV. In the
14 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

last incident, Victim II explained that she was talking to her grandfather on the
phone when Crawford started rubbing her stomach and started moving his hand
toward her breasts, before she pushed his hands away.
The crux of this appeal, as it relates to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
turns on whether Victim II's testimony concerning Count II about Crawford
touching her outside her vaginal area refers to touching Victim II's genitalia.
Victim II's testimony is problematic in this case because Victim II's testimony
about being touched outside the vaginal area does not clarify whether Crawford
touched her genitalia or touched her outside of the genitalia. The phrase vaginal
area is ambiguous; this Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have used the phrase to
refer to the genital area, but the courts have also used the phrase more specifically
to refer to the area around the vaginal orifice. Compare, e.g., State v. Cardell, 132
Idaho 217,220,970 P.2d 10, 13 (1998) (interchanging vaginal area with genitalia),
and State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643,649 84 P.3d 579,585 (Ct. App. 2004)
(equating vaginal area with genital area), with State v. Lewis, 96 Idaho 743, 745,
536 P.2d 738, 740 (1975) (describing a doctor's testimony in which the doctor
explained that he found no evidence of torn or bruised tissue in the vaginal area,
presumably referring to the specific area around the vaginal orifice), and State v.
Durst, 126 Idaho 140, 143, 879 P.2d 603,606 (Ct. App. 1994) (discussing a
physician's testimony in which "[h]e testified that in his opinion, to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, the victim's injuries were caused by a forced entry of
the vaginal area by penile penetration."). Similarly, the courts have used the term
vagina where, in context, the proper term should be external genitalia. E.g., State v.
Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678,687,273 P.3d 1271, 1280 (2012 (paraphrasing the
victim's testimony to explain that "Pepcorn placed his hand on her thigh then
slowly moved it up to her vagina and let it rest there as she rode in front of him on
four-wheeler rides."). The vagina is, in fact, an internal genital, but genitalia also
includes the external genitals, namely the vulva.
In considering Victim ]J's testimony, the majority opinion errs by using Victim II's
general testimony about Craw.ford's touching throughout the years in support of
Victim ]J's statements about the kitchen incident. Specifically, the majority relies
upon Victim 11 acknowledging that throughout the years, Craw.ford would touch
her on her upper thigh, close to her private area, close to where her underwear
was at, and up to her privates. But Victim Il's testimony about Craw.ford's
actions throughout the years did not state that Craw.ford specifically touched her
this way during the kitchen incident. Afore importantly, even though Craw.ford may
have touched Victim 11 close to her genitalia throughout the years, the general
testimony did not state that Crawford actually touched any part of her genitalia.
The majority also attempts to support its use o.fthe general testimony about the
touching by contending that "the kitchen incident is the only incident to which an
assertion that Craw.ford had touched 'up there to [Victim Il's] privates' would
logically correlate. " This contention is incorrect. In her testimony about the
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television and blanket incident (or incidents), Victim JI acknowledged that she
removed Crawford's hand "from around [herJ vaginal area or from near [herJ
vaginal area, " but this testimony related to another incident and count.
In fact, the testimony about Crawford's touching throughout the years is far too
general to relate to any specific incident; Count IL as clarified by the prosecutor,
only focuses on the kitchen incident. Besides the fact that Victim ]J's testimony is
too general to relate to any specific incident, it would still be unreasonable for a
jury to draw an inference that Crawford actually touched Victim ]J's genitalia
during the kitchen incident, because Victim II never indicated that Crawford
actually touched her genitalia in her general testimony about Crawford's actions
throughout the years.
Although unaddressed by the majority opinion, there was testimony at the criminal
trial that clarifies what Victim II was referring to in the kitchen incident. A sex
crimes investigator with the Meridian Police Department interviewed Victim 11
During his testimony, he explained what Victim II told him in regard to the kitchen
incident:
[The prosecutor]: And did [Victim II] tell you what her response was when she indicated
that [Crawford] had made a quick move toward her to show her what a clit was?
[The investigator]: Yes, she had indicated that he had reached his hand up the pants leg
ofher shorts.
[The prosecutor]: Okay.
[The investigator]: He was trying to get her-get his hand inside of her underwear and
she stepped away from him and told him no.
The investigator's testimony is consistent with Victim ll's testimony that she
"backed away when he was going to show me" what a clitoris was. However,
Victim II indicated to the investigator that Crawford tried to get his hand inside of
her underwear (presumably trying to make contact with her genitalia). The
reasonable inference drawn from Victim ]J's and the investigator's testimony is
that Crawford was attempting to touch the genital area under Victim ]J's
underwear, but touched Victim II outside of her genital area and did not touch her
external genitalia.
Taken together, the evidence and all reasonable inferences do not lead to the
conclusion that Crawford touched Victim Il's genitalia during the kitchen incident;
rather, the evidence and inferences lead to the opposite conclusion. For this reason,
I would hold that defense counsel provided deficient performance by failing to
move for judgment of acquittal, as it would have been objectively reasonable to
make such a motion. I would also conclude that appellate counsel provided
deficient performance by failing to raise the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, as
this issue was clearly stronger than the issues presented in the first appeal.
Prejudice is shown in both instances because a favorable ruling would have led to
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Crawford being acquitted of Count II.

Crawfordv. State, Exhibit B, pg. 12-16. (Gutierrez, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
As demonstrated by Chief Judge Gutierrez, there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the
conviction. Thus, trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for not raising a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. This Court should grant review under I.AR. 118(b)(4) because the
Court of Appeals has unreasonably determined there was sufficient evidence to establish that Mr.
Crawford engaged in manual-genital touching.
D.

The Court ofAppeals Erred in Finding That Trial Counsel's Failure to Request an
Affirmative Answer to the Jury's Inquiry or to Request the Court to Define the Word
"Genitalia" Was Not Deficient Performance on the Part of Trial Counsel

During the trial, the jury was instructed and excused to deliberate. (T pg. 482, In. 7 - pg.
492, In. 7; pg. 534, In. 12.) During deliberations, the jury sent a number of questions to the judge.
(T pg. 542, In. 6-pg. 546, In. 2.) Question number three had two parts, as follows:
[l .] In order to have committed manual - genital contact does it require touching the
vaginal area?
[2.] Does touching of breast-area constitute manual-genital contact?
In response to part two, defense counsel stated that the answer was "no." (T pg. 544, In. 21.) The
district court stated that it was "not going to define for them manual-genital." (T pg. 544, In.
21-24.) The state asked that the jury just be informed that they needed to reread the instructions.
(T p. 545, In. 6-7.) The district court noted:
Well, if the jury- I do not feel comfortable defining, and, in fact, there is case law
that says not only should you default to the standard instructions, but that while while it may see - it's tempting to want to define every single word, that it's
inappropriate for the court to do so and that the jurors have to apply their
understanding - their common ordinary understanding to it. And, therefore, I'm
just going to tell them to reread the instructions.

Cf p. 545, In. 8-18.) The jury was then specifically informed, "Please re-read all the instructions."
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(CR 68.) The jury returned a guilty verdict on Counts I and II after being so instructed. (CR 8.)
Mr. Crawford also argued that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ask the court, in response
to the first part of question #3, to either tell the jury that manual contact with the vaginal area was
required or to define "genital." Had trial counsel made a proper request, the district court would
have given the jury proper instructions and the jury would have acquitted him of both Counts I
and IL (CR 9-10.)
Due to trial counsel's failure to object, appellate counsel was not able to raise the jury
instruction error regarding that particular jury question. "Generally Idaho's appellate courts will
not consider error not preserved for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209,224,245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). Had the issue been preserved, the Court of Appeals
would have vacated the conviction on Count II under the same reasoning it vacated the conviction
on Count I. State v. Crawford, pg. 4.
In the direct appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had a duty to further
instruct the jury due to the jury inquiry writing that "if a jury makes explicit its difficulties with a
point of law pertinent to the case, thereby revealing a defect, ambiguity, or gap in the instructions,
then the trial court has the duty to give such additional instructions on the law as are reasonably
necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt or confusion." State v. Crawford, supra (Exhibit A), citing

State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,282, 77 P.3d 956, 971 (2003). Sheahan, in turn, relied upon
Dawson v. Olson, 97 Idaho 274, 543 P.2d 499 (1975), where this Court wTote, "There may be
situations in which a trial judge may decline to answer questions put by the jury, but where a jury
returns on its own motion indicating confusion, the court has the duty to give such additional
instruction on the law as the court may think necessary to clarify the jury's doubt or confusion."
97 Idaho at 281, 543 P.2d at 507, quoting Worthington v. Obertuber, 125 A.2d 621 (Penn. 1966).
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In addition, I.C. §§ 19-2132(a) and 19-2204 provide that the trial court must instruct the jurors on

all matters of law necessary for their information.
Just as the jury's second question ("Does touching of the breast area constitute manualgenital contact?") imposed upon the trial court a "duty to give additional instructions on the law
reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt or confusion," the jury's first question ("In order
to have committed manual-genital contact, does it require touching the vaginal area?") showed
that the jury was confused about whether the evidence on Count II, i.e., that Mr. Crawford
touched An.C. "Outside of [her] vaginal area" was sufficient to sustain the conviction. (T pg.
243, In. 15-16.) The jury's first question showed that it understood that external touching within
the vaginal area, i.e., the external genitalia, was sufficient, but was confused over whether being
touched outside the vaginal area was sufficient to prove Count II because that was all An.C.
testified to. Trial counsel should have asked the trial court to give additional instructions on this
issue. Thus, trial counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland v. Washington, supra.
Had the jury question been answered properly, the jury would have acquitted Mr.
Crawford. But even if the trial court had denied defense counsel's request, the request would
have preserved the issue for appeal and alerted appellate counsel to the issue. The Court of
Appeals would have reversed the conviction on Count II due to the trial court's jury instruction
error. Thus, trial counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial under Strickland and the trial
court erred in summarily dismissing this aspect of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.
1.

The Court of Appeals' majority opinion on the jury inquiry issue

As to the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the court's
response to the jury inquiry, the Court of Appeals was also not unanimous. The majority stated:
Crawford contends that his trial counsel also provided ineffective assistance by
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failing to request that the district court define "genital" or give an affirmative
answer to a jury question of whether touching the "vaginal area" was required for
manual-genital contact under the statute. In general, it is within the trial court's
discretion to determine whether, and the manner in which, to respond to a question
posed by the jury during deliberations. I.C.R. 30(c); State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho
267,282, 77 P.3d 956, 971 (2003); State v. Pinkney, 115 Idaho 1152, 1154, 772
P.2d 1246, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). This grant of discretion is premised on the
assumption that the instructions as given are clear, direct, and proper statements of
the law. Pinkney, 115 Idaho at 1154, 772 P.2d at 1248. Consequently, if a jury
expresses doubt or confusion on a point of law correctly and adequately covered in
a given instruction, the trial court in its discretion may explain the given instruction
or further instruct the jury, but it is under no duty to do so. Id. However, if a jury
makes explicit its difficulties with a point of law pertinent to the case, thereby
revealing a defect, ambiguity or gap in the instructions, then the trial court has the
duty to give such additional instructions on the law as are reasonably necessary to
alleviate the jury's doubt or confusion Id.; see also LC.§§ 19-2132(a) and
19-2204 (providing that a trial court must instruct the jury on all matters of law
necessary for their information).
Here, the jury was instructed that, in order to find Crawford guilty of lewd conduct
as charged in Count II, the jury had to find that the state proved Crawford
committed an act of manual-genital contact upon or with the body of Victim IL
The jury instructions did not define "genital." During deliberations, the jury asked
several questions, including the question at issue here: "In order to have committed
manual-genital contact, does it require touching the vaginal area? Does touching of
the breast-area constitute manual-genital contact?" Crawford's counsel indicated
that he believed the answer was "no." The district court stated, "No, the answer is
reread the instructions. I'm not going to define for them manual-genital contact."
The state agreed with the district court. The district court concluded:
Well, if the jury-I do not feel comfortable defining, and, in fact, there's case law
that says not only should you default to the standard instructions, but that
while-while it may seem-it's tempting to want to define every single word, that
it's inappropriate for the court to do so and that the jurors have to apply their
understanding-their common ordinary understanding to it. And, therefore, I'm just
going to tell them to reread the instructions.
Crawford argues that it was objectively deficient performance for his trial counsel
not to either request that the district court define "genital" or provide an affirmative
response to the first sentence of the jury's question. Crawford also argues that, had
trial counsel made such a request, the issue would have been preserved for appeal,
and the district court's decision would have been reversed on appeal. However, this
claim relies on Crawford's assertion that "vaginal area" is synonymous with
"genital" as used in I.C. § 18-1508. This is incorrect. The jury was properly
instructed as to the elements of the crime charged in Count II that they were
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required to find beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury's question of whether
touching the "vaginal area" was required for manual-genital contact does not
indicate difficulties or confusion as to the law that could not be adequately
resolved by the instructions given: the state had to prove manual-genital contact,
not "vaginal area" contact. Thus, the district court had discretion on whether and in
what manner to instruct the jury further regarding its question.
The district court opted to instruct the jury to "reread the jury instructions," leaving
to the jury the decision of whether the evidence, as presented, sufficed to constitute
manual-genital contact as charged in Count II. As noted by the district court in its
summary dismissal, terms which are of common usage and are generally
understood need not be further defined when instructing the jury. State v. Draper,
151 Idaho 576,589,261 P.3d 853, 866 (2011); State v. Caldwell, 140 Idaho 740,
742, 101 P.3d 233,235 (Ct. pp. 004). Crawford concedes that the common
understanding of the term "genital" usually refers to the external genitalia,
including the labia and clitoris, but also includes the internal sex organs, such as
the vagina, cervix, and uterus. See, e.g., Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 946 (1993) (defining "genitalia" as "the organs of the reproductive
system; esp: the external genital organs"). Thus, the trial court did not err by not
defining "genital" further for the jury, and the decision by Crawford's trial counsel
not to request that the trial court do so did not constitute ineffective assistance.
Additionally, as noted by the district court and previously discussed, an affirmative
answer to the jury's question would have been inaccurate and may have confused
the jury, as the "vaginal area" and "genitals" are not necessarily synonymous.
Although touching the vaginal area is sufficient, it does not solely constitute
manual-genital contact under I.C. § 18-1508. Moreover, the state bore the burden
of proving manual-genital contact, not "vaginal area" contact, so an instruction that
touching the vaginal area was required would have been erroneous. As a result,
Crawford's trial counsel was not ineffective for not requesting that the trial court
provide a definition of the commonly understood term "genital" or provide an
inaccurate affirmative response to the jury question, as those requests would have
been properly denied.

Crawford v. State, Exhibit B, pg. 9-11.
2.

Why the Court should accept review on the jury inquiry issue

Chief Judge Gutierrez again dissented:
Finally, Crawford asserts that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to request that the court define genital in response to part of a
jury question or provide an affirmative response to the first part of the same jury
question. During jury deliberations, the jury asked the court a two-part question,
which stated, "In order to have committed manual-genital contact, does it require
21

•

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

touching the vaginal area? Does touching of the breast area constitute manual-genital contact?"
Crawford's defense counsel recommended a single answer, saying, "No." The court responded,
"No, the answer is reread the instructions. I'm not going to define for them manual-genital." The
court then referred to the prosecutor, and the prosecutor expressed her view that the jury asked a
two-part question: "I think they have a two-part question, does it include the vaginal area and does
it [] include breast. So, I mean, how can you say no?" Following the prosecutor's remarks, the
court decided that it would instruct the jury to reread the instructions.

The majority concludes that the jury's question "does not indicate difficulties or
confusion as to the law that could not be adequately resolved by the instructions
given. " I disagree; so, too, did the panel on direct appeal. State v. Crawford,
Docket No. 38787 at 3 (Ct. App. June 27, 2012) ("By asking, 'In order to have
committed manual-genital contact, does it require touching the vaginal area?
Does touching of the breast-area constitute manual-genital contact?' the jury
expressed doubt or confusion on a point of law not adequately covered in the
jury instructions and pertinent to this case, thereby revealing a defect, ambiguity,
or gap in the instructions. Thus, the district court had the duty to give additional
instructions on the law reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt or
confusion.''). As this Court explained in the prior unpublished opinion, in general,
it is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether, and the manner in
which, to respond to a question posed by the jury during deliberations. State v.
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 282, 77 P.3d 956, 971 (2003). This grant of discretion is
premised on the assumption that the instructions as given are clear, direct, and
proper statements of the law. Id. Consequently, if a jury expresses doubt or
confusion on a point of law correctly and adequately covered in a given
instruction, the trial court in its discretion may explain the given instruction or
further instruct the jury, but it is under no duty to do so. Id. However, if a jury
makes explicit its difficulties with a point of law pertinent to the case, thereby
revealing a defect, ambiguity or gap in the instructions, then the trial court has the
duty to give such additional instructions on the law as are reasonably necessary to
alleviate the jury's doubt or confusion. Id. Under this reasoning, we held in the
direct appeal that the district court had the duty to give additional instructions
on the law reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt or confusion
concerning manual-genital contact. See Crawford, Docket No. 38787 at 3.
The last issue raised by Crawford in this appeal, though, is not whether the district
court erred when it failed to give clarifying instructions, but whether counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel. I would hold that it was objectively
unreasonable for defense counsel not to request that the court otherwise clarify the
law to alleviate the jury's doubt or confusion. Had defense counsel requested the
court to otherwise clarify the law to alleviate the jury's doubt or confusion, and the
court given the instruction, there is a reasonable probability that Crawford would
have been acquitted by the jury.
In summary, the district court erred by granting the State's motion for summary
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dismissal. As for Crawford's cross-motion for summary disposition, there is no genuine issue of
material fact, and Crawford is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the three
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; accordingly, the district court erred by denying
Crawford's cross-motion for summary disposition.

Crawford v. State, Exhibit B, pg. I 6-18. (Gutierrez, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
As pointed out in the dissent, the majority's opinion here is inconsistent with the Court of
Appeals's opinion in the direct appeal. The Court of Appeals in the direct appeal stated that the
inquiry showed that the jury was confused about the instructions and clarification was required,
while the Court in this case finds the opposite. Consequently, this Court should grant review
under I.A.R. 118(b)(3) because the Court of Appeals's ruling that the trial court did not need to
give additional instructions to the jury is in conflict with the Court of Appeals's decision in Mr.
Crawford's the previous appeal where it held that the trial court was so required. State v.

Crawford, supra.

E.

Conclusion
This Court should grant review, reverse the decision granting summary disposition to the

state and also reverse the order denying Mr. Crawford's motion for summary disposition and
order that judgment be entered in Mr. Crawford's favor.
Respectfully submitted thisX\ay of February, 2015.

~~~~-Dennis Benja~\
Attorney for Shane Crawford
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MELANSON, Judge
Shane Erick Crawford appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentences for two
counts of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen. For the reasons set forth below,
we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for a new trial.
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE
In 2010, the state filed a complaint charging Crawford with two counts of lewd conduct
with a minor under the age of sixteen, LC. § 18-1508, identified as Count I and Count Il. The
state also charged Crawford with two counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen
(Counts IIl and JV). The alleged victim in Count 1 was Victim 1 and the alleged victim in the
remaining counts was Victim ll.

Crawford was found guilty of Count l and Count II and

acquitted of the two remaining counts. The district court imposed concurrent unified terms of
twenty five years, with minimum periods of confinement of six years, for Count I and Count II.
Crawford appeals.
II.

ANALYSIS
Crawford argues that the district court denied his right to due process by failing to
instruct the jury, in response to a jury question, that the breast area is not a genital for the
purpose of finding Crawford guilty of lewd conduct pursuant to J.C. § 18-1508. Crawford also
argues that the district court imposed excessive sentences.
A.

Jury Question
Idaho Code Section 18-1508 provides:
Any person who shall commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or
with the body or any part or member thereof of a minor child under the age of
sixteen (16) years, including but not limited to, genital-genital contact, oralgenital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, or
manual~genital contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or
who shall involve such minor child in any act of bestiality or sado~masochism as
defined in section 18-1507, Idaho Code, when any of such acts are done with the
intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires
of such person, such minor child, or third party, shall be guilty of a felony and
shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term of not more than life.

Here, in Count I, the state alleged that Crawford committed lewd conduct with Victim I by
having manual-genital contact with her with the intent to appeal to and or gratify his sexual
desire. Likewise, the state alleged in Count II that Crawford committed lewd conduct with
Victim II by having manual-genital contact with her with the intent to appeal to and or gratify his
sexual desire.
At trial, Victim I testified that, while she was lying on a couch in a living room and
watching a movie with Crawford, Crawford reached up her shirt and groped her breasts and then
moved his hand into her underwear and touched her vagina. Victim II testified that, while she
was in a kitchen with Crawford, Crawford asked her "what a clit was." Victim II testified that,
when she responded that she did not know, Crawford said, "Well, let me show you;" approached
her as she backed away; and put his hand up her shorts and touched the outside ofher vaginal
area. Victim II also testified that, on another occasion, she was on a couch with Crawford and he
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rubbed her upper thigh and moved up toward her "bikini line." Victim II further testified that, on
a different occasion, Crawford exposed his penis and tried to show it to her but she looked away.
Additionally, Victim II testified that Crawford grabbed her breast in front of others at a party in a
joking way. Finally, Victim II testified that, while she was on the phone on one occasion with
her grandfather, Crawford began rubbing her stomach and moving his hand toward her breast,
but she kept pushing Crawford's hand away.
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated to the jury:
At the end of the day and at the end of your deliberations, I'm going to ask
you to come back and return a verdict of guilty against [Crawford], guilty of
[Count I] involving [Victim I] on the sofa for rubbing her tummy, going up to her
breasts and doWn into her vagina .
. . . . [Count II] is [Victim II] and this is the episode where [Victim II]
testified [Crawford] asked her if she knew what her clit was and he put her fingers
up. That's what [Count II] is referring to.
[Count III] refers to when [Crawford] pulled his penis out, he exposed it
and nudged [Victim II] and told her to look and talked about how he groomed it.
That's [Count III].
And [Count N] is when [Crawford] grabs (Victim II's] breasts and also
when he's rubbing up toward her panty line getting closer and closer.
During deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the district court asking, "IJ;!'t1.(1'E~er
f0"'%h1t,Wl¥'(:f@mmitt€'.d~rmanu.abg~nital'.;eoma~t;t'·doeiFiit1frequife'?tt'&'U&li'in'!fst4tle;;,iJfagihtitiifatea?:-,,IDot~
t~hl.fil:)t0&-!:)fJhe4orea~tc.tarea1 c't5'fi~fftUtt"manifal2:gefrif[fJif'~mrta:Ef'?''14'1:t1trt~iff~tfitfpriis'el1e"e,"o:f,th~,;j;Jiry,

efaWf°&Fct""'S''1ecrtln'Sel"intfit~teli"'lh'al"'fl6·t,beli.e¥e0<:,thet0ams,weTh,\WaB~n~~~)ifi}tifdisti:l&tt'i01::trt,•stated;~,
'\.\,fi{N;~th(t"iaUS.¥'V€:f:i,iiS1;,r~readr"tn·efai'r! SfrUefi0n!$;Jc;t,,,,a:,',fm"a:h§tlf;:g61fi~tO):i:'definet,~f5fiitfiem'5•fhantitrfc:gen,itaJc:;i
0

~e011taetd~i" The state agreed with the district court. The district court concluded:
Well, if the jury--I do not feel comfortable defining, and, in fact, there's
case law that says not only should you default to the standard instructions, but that
while--while it may seem--it's tempting to want to define every single word, that
it's inappropriate for the court to do so and that the jurors have to apply their
understanding--their common ordinary understanding to it. And, therefore, I'm
just going to tell them to reread the instructions.
Thus, the district court informed the jury to "re-read all the instructions." During deliberations,
the jury also asked the district court to confirm that:
[Count !]-[Victim I] on couch incident
[Count IJ]-[Victim IIl being asked about "clit"
[Count JII]-Penis exposure to [Victim II]
[Count lV]-[Victim II] on phone [with] grandfather [and] touching her
3

In response, the district court informed the jury that the alleged victim in Count I was Victim I,
the alleged victim in the remaining counts was Victim II, and the jury was to rely on its memory
of the evidence.
As noted above, Crawford argues that the district court denied his right to due process by
responding to the jury's question without clarifying that the breast area is not a genital for the
purpose of finding Crawford guilty of lewd conduct pursuant to LC. § 18-1508. In general, it is
within the trial court's discretion to determine whether, and the manner in which, to respond to a
question posed by the jury during deliberations. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 282, 77 P.3d
956, 971 (2003); State v. Pinkney, 115 Idaho 1152, 1154, 772 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).
This grant of discretion is premised on the assumption that the instructions as given are clear,
direct, and proper statements of the law.

Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 282, 77 P.3d at 971.

Consequently, if a jury expresses doubt or confusion on a point of law correctly and adequately
covered in a given instruction, the trial court in its discretion may explain the given instruction or
further instruct the jury, but it is under no duty to do so. Id. However, if a jury makes explicit its
difficulties with a point of law pertinent to the case, thereby revealing a defect, ambiguity or gap
in the instructions, then the trial court has the duty to give such additional instructions on the law
as are reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt or confusion. Id.
Here, Crawford was charged with two counts of lewd conduct pursuant to LC. § 18-1508.
Jury instruction thirteen informed the jury that, in order to find Crawford guilty of lewd conduct
as charged in Count I, the jury had to find that the state proved Crawford committed an act of
manual-genital contact upon or with the body of Victim L Jury instruction fourteen instructed
the jury in the same manner with respect to Count II and Victim II. By asking, "In order to have
committed manual-genital contact, does it require touching the vaginal area? Does touching of
the breast-area constitute manual-genital contact?" the jury expressed doubt or confusion on a
point of law not adequately covered in the jury instructions and pertinent to this case, thereby
revealing a defect, ambiguity, or gap in the instructions. Thus, the district court had the duty to
give additional instructions on the law reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt or
confusion. In State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 487, 80 P.3d 1083, 1088 (2003), the Idaho
Supreme Court held that the act of touching of a minor's chest area does not fall within those
acts specifically enumerated in J.C. § l 8-1508 and a defendant cannot be convicted under the
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statute for such contact. Therefore, as a matter of law, touching a child's breast area does not
amount to manual-genital contact. By answering the jury's question regarding whether touching
of the breast area constitutes manual-genital contact with the instruction to "re-read all the
instructions" and by not informing the jury of the Court's holding in Kavajecz, the district court
erred.
However, error is harmless and not reversible if the reviewing court is convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. State

v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,221,245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010). Thus, we examine whether the alleged
error complained of in the present case was harmless. See State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 578,
114 P.3d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 2005).
Crawford argues that it is impossible to discern whether the jury reached its verdict with
respect to Count I and Count II on a valid theory of law because the jury heard testimony from
both Victim I and Victim II that Crawford had touched their breast area. Therefore, Crawford
asserts that, pursuant to State v. Townsend, 124 Idaho 881, 888, 865 P.2d 972, 979 (1993), his
judgment of conviction and sentences must be vacated and his case remanded for a new trial.
In Townsend, the jury was instructed that it could convict Townsend of aggravated
battery if it found that Townsend's use of either his vehicle or his hands during the battery
constituted use of a deadly weapon as proscribed by the statute. However, the instruction that
the jury could find Townsend guilty of aggravated battery by considering his hands deadly
weapons was legally incorrect because hands do not constitute deadly weapons under the statute.

Id at 887, 865 P.2d at 978. The jury verdict did not specify whether the jury found that the
aggravated battery was committed with Townsend's vehicle, his hands, or both. Thus, the Court
was unable to discern whether the jury based its verdict on a valid or an invalid legal theory. The
Court determined that the appropriate disposition, in view of the holding that one of the theories
of criminal liability given to the jury (use of the vehicle as a deadly weapon) was legally valid
and the other theory by which the jury was instructed it could find Townsend guilty of
aggravated battery (use of his hands as deadly weapons) was legally invalid, was to vacate the
conviction and sentence and remand the case for a new trial. Id at 888, 865 P.2d at 979.
The state argues that, even if the district court erred by not instructing the jury that
touching of a minor's chest area docs not fall within those acts specifically enumerated in J.C.
§ 18-1508 in response to the jury question, such effor was harmless regarding Count II because
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that count did not involve any testimony or allegation that Crawford touched Victim II's breasts.
We agree. As noted above, during closing argument, the state argued what conduct Crawford
allegedly committed that constituted the offense of lewd conduct charged in Count II.
Specifically, the state informed the jury that Count II involved the episode where Crawford
allegedly asked Victim II "if she knew what her clit was and he put her fingers up." Defense
counsel, during closing argument, referred to Count II as involving the same incident.
Additionally, during deliberations, the jury asked the district court to confirm that the alleged
conduct related to Count II was Victim II "being asked about 'clit'." Thus, we are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that, with respect to Count II, the jury did not consider Victim Il's
testimony regarding Crawford's touching of her breast area at other times and reached its verdict
on a valid legal theory. Therefore, even though the district court erred by not instructing the jury
that touching of a minor's chest area does not fall within those acts specifically enumerated in
LC. § 18-1508 in response to the jury question, such error was harmless regarding Count II.
However, with respect to Count I, the episode in which the state alleged Crawford
committed lewd conduct included his touching of both Victim I's breast and vaginal areas.
Specifically, the state alleged that Count I involved Victim I "on the sofa for rubbing her tummy,
going up to her breasts and down into her vagina." Further, the jury asked the district court to
confirm that the alleged conduct related to Count I was Victim I "on couch incident." Instruction
provided to the jury must not permit the defendant to be convicted of conduct that does not
constitute the type of crime charged. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342, 256 P.3d 735, 750
(2011 ). Because of the district court's lack of instruction to the jury that touching of a minor's
chest area did not fall within those acts specifically enumerated in I.C. § 18-1508 in response to
the jury question, the jury could have found Crawford guilty of lewd conduct on Count I based
on an invalid legal theory--that Crawford committed manual-genital contact with Victim II by
touching her breast area.

Because it is impossible to discern what theory the jury based its

verdict on, we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's error did not
contribute to the jury's verdict with respect to Count I. Thus, the error was not was harmless.
As in Townsend, the appropriate disposition is to vacate Crawford's conviction and sentence
with respect to Count I and remand the case for a new trial.

6

B.

Excessive Sentences
Crawford also argues that the sentences imposed by the district court are excessive.

Because we vacate Crawford's judgment of conviction and sentence with respect to Count I, we
need only address Crawford's claim with respect to Count II.
An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v.

Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 2000). Where a sentence is not illegal,
the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear abuse of discretion.

State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A sentence may represent such
an abuse of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice,
103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it
appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is necessary "to accomplish the primary
objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650
P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). Where an appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed
an excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record, having regard
for the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771,772,653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). When
reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver,
144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387,391 (2007).
At the sentencing hearing in this case, the district court noted that it wanted to make sure
Crawford's sentence fulfilled the objectives of protecting the community and the victims. The
district court also noted that it did not believe Crawford was amenable to rehabilitation in the
short term. The district court detailed six disciplinary actions taken against Crawford while he
was incarcerated on an unrelated matter.

The district court further commented that it was

surprised that, having been in the military, Crawford had difficulty following the rules. The
district court determined that Crawford's inability to follow rules did not make him a good
candidate for being out in the community. In addition, the district court noted the findings in the
psychosexual evaluation that Crawford was a moderate risk to reoffend and tended to manage
emotions through repression and denial, which seemed to influence his engaging in inappropriate
sexual behavior. The district court also noted the findings in the psychosexual evaluation that
Crawford was not amenable to sex offender treatment due to his lack of acknowledgement of
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inappropriate sexual behavior. The district court determined that, because Crawford was not
amenable to treatment, he needed to be incarcerated for a significant period of time. In light of
the foregoing, the district court imposed a unified term of twenty five years, with a minimum
period of confinement of six years, for Count II.
After an independent review of the record and having regard for the nature of the offense,
the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest, we conclude that the
sentence imposed by the district court with respect to Count II was reasonable upon the facts of
this case. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Crawford to a unified
term of twenty-five years, with a minimum period of confinement of six years, for Count II.

III.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred by answering the jury's question regarding whether touching of
the breast area constitutes manual-genital contact pursuant to J.C. § 18-1508 with the instruction
to "re-read all the instructions" and by not instructing the jury that the act of touching a minor's
chest area does not fall within those acts specifically enumerated in the statute. While such error
was harmless with respect to Count II, the error was not harmless with respect to Count I. The
district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing Crawford's sentence for Count II.
Accordingly, we affirm Crawford's judgment of conviction and sentence with respect to Count
II, but we vacate Crawford's judgment of conviction and sentence with respect to Count I and
remand for a new trial.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LANSING, CONCUR.
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MELANSON, Judge
Shane Crawford appeals from the district court's judgment summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
A jury found Crawford guilty of two counts of lewd conduct with a minor child under the
age of sixteen, J.C. § 18-1508. 1 The convictions were based on incidents involving two of

Idaho Code Section 18-1508 provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who shall commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or
with the body or any part or member thereof of a minor child under the age of
sixteen (16) years, including but not limited to, manual-genital conduct ... when
any of such acts are done with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying
the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person, such minor child, or third
party, shall be guilty of a felony ....

EXHIBIT~

Crawford's daughters. The victim in Count I alleged that Crawford had fondled her breasts and
touched her vagina. The victim in Count II alleged that, while he was in the kitchen with her,
Crawford had asked her whether she knew what a clitoris was, approached her as she backed
away, and touched outside of her vaginal area in an attempt to show her.

During jury

deliberations, the jury sent the following questions to the judge: "In order to have manualgenital contact, does it require touching the vaginal area? Does touching of the breast-area
constitute manual-genital contact?" Crawford's counsel proposed that the district court answer
"no," but the district court refused because it did not want to define what "manual-genital"
meant. The state proposed that the district court direct the jury to reread the jury instructions,
which the district court did. The jury returned a guilty verdict of both counts and Crawford was
sentenced to concurrent unified terms of twenty-five years, each with a minimum period of
confinement of six years. 2

Crawford appealed.

In an unpublished opinion, this Court

determined that the district court's failure to provide additional instructions to clear up the jury's
confusion regarding the applicable law indicated by the second sentence of the jury question was
reversible error as to Count I. 3 See State v. Crawford, Docket No. 38587 (Ct. App. June 27,
2012). Accordingly, we vacated Count I of Crawford's judgment of conviction and sentence and
remanded for a new trial on that count. However, we determined that the error was harmless as
to Count II and affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence for that count. On remand, the
state dismissed Count I.
Crawford filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his judgment of conviction under
Count II for lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen. In his petition, Crawford alleged
that he had received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

Specifically, he

asserted that trial counsel was deficient for failing to move for judgment of acquittal as to
Count II on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict. He further
argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the district court define
"genital" in "manual-genital contact" as requiring contact with the vaginal area, which also
2

Crawford was also charged with two counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of
sixteen for other conduct with Victim II, but the jury acquitted him of those counts.
3

Specifically, we concluded that the district court should have instructed the jury further to
clarify that touching of the breast area does not constitute manual-genital contact. See State v.
Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 486-87, 80 P.3d I 083, 1087-88 (2003) (holding that touching or
kissing of the chest area of a minor child is not lewd conduct as defined under I.C. § 18-1508).
2

resulted in that issue not being preserved for appeal. Crawford also alleged that his appellate
counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to assert an insufficiency of the evidence claim
as to Count II on appeal because it was the strongest issue on appeal for that count.
The state filed an answer and motion for summary dismissal, asserting that Crawford's
proposed equation of the vaginal area with "genitals" as used in the statute was incorrect and that
the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Crawford had engaged in
manual-genital contact with Victim II. Crawford responded with a cross-motion for summary
disposition, arguing that the state had not specifically denied his factual allegations in his
petition, which he claimed created a prima facie case showing ineffective assistance of trial and
appellate counsel. After a hearing, the district court denied Crawford's cross-motion and granted
the state's motion for summary dismissal. The district court reasoned that a motion for judgment
of acquittal before or after the verdict would not have been successful because there was
substantial circumstantial evidence giving rise to a reasonable inference that Crawford had
engaged in manual-genital contact with Victim II. The district court also concluded that, for the
same reasons, an insufficiency of the evidence claim would not have been successful on appeal.
In addition, the district court determined that a request to define "genitals" or to answer "yes" to
the jury's question asking whether manual-genital contact required touching the vaginal area
would have been denied as improper and an inaccurate statement of what the law required.
Accordingly, the district court concluded that Crawford's trial and appellate counsel had not
provided ineffective assistance and summarily dismissed Crawford's petition for post-conviction
relief. Crawford appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature.
LC.§ 19-4907; Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2009); State v.

Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (I 983); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921,

828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner must prove
by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief
is based. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002). A petition
for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. Dunlap v. State,
141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004). A petition must contain much more than a short
3

and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l).
Rather, a petition for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner, and affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations must be attached or the petition must state why such supporting evidence is not
included with the petition. I.C. § 19-4903. In other words, the petition must present or be
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations or the petition will be subject to
dismissal. Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011).
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for postconviction relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the court's own initiative, if it
appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When considering
summary dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner's favor, but
the court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions oflaw. Roman v. State, 125
Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715
P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986). Moreover, the district court, as the trier of fact, is not constrained
to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary disposition; rather, the
district court is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted
evidence.

Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008).

Such

inferences will not be disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify
them. Id.
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven
by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a
prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do
not justify relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281
(2010); DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). Thus, summary
dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief is appropriate when the court can conclude, as a
matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all disputed facts construed in
the petitioner's favor. For this reason, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be
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appropriate even when the state does not controvert the petitioner's evidence. See Roman, 125
Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901.
Conversely, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege
facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be
summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004);

Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920,923 (Ct. App. 2008). If a genuine issue of
material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues.

Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629.
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by
the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner's admissible evidence asserts facts which, if
true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925,
929 (2010); Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.3d at 923. Over questions of law, we exercise free
review. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250,220 P.3d at 1069; Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367,370, 33
P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).

III.
ANALYSIS
Crawford does not allege that there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring an
evidentiary hearing.

Instead, he argues that the district court erred in granting summary

dismissal in favor of the state and denying his cross-motion for summary dismissal because he is
entitled to relief as a matter of law. Specifically, Crawford makes three claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. He alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a motion
for judgment of acquittal and for failing to request that the district court define the term "genital"
or respond affirmatively to the jury's question asking whether touching the "vaginal area" was
required for manual-genital contact. Crawford also asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to contest the sufficiency of the evidence as to Count II on appeal.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the postconviction procedure act. Murray, 121 Idaho at 924-25, 828 P.2d at 1329-30. To prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance
was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App.
1995). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's
5

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 68788; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish prejudice,
the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;

Aragon, 114 Idaho at 7 61, 7 60 P .2d at 1177. We have long adhered to the proposition that
tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those
decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings
capable of objective evaluation. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 383, 313 P.3d 1, 39 (2013);

Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994). Indeed, there is a
strong presumption that trial counsel was competent and that trial tactics were based on sound
legal strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 58-59, 106 P.3d 376,
384-85 (2004).

A.

Sufficiency of the Evidence at Trial
Crawford argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to make a

motion for judgment of acquittal under I.C.R. 29 both before and after the jury verdict. Whether
to move for judgment of acquittal is a tactical or strategic decision. See State v. Kraft, 96 Idaho
901, 905, 539 P.2d 254, 257-58 (1975). Generally, the failure to make a motion for judgment of
acquittal cannot form the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Adair, 99
Idaho 703, 707-08, 587 P.2d 1238, 1242-43 (1978). This is especially true when the reviewing
court concludes that sufficient evidence to withstand such a motion was presented. See id. at
707, 587 P.2d at 1242; Kraft, 96 Idaho at 905, 539 P.2d at 257. Indeed, where the alleged
deficiency is counsel's failure to make or file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued,
would not have been granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the

Strickland test.

Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 1996).

Accordingly, the summary dismissal of Crawford's claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel was proper if there was sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could have denied
a motion for judgment of acquittal.
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 provides that, when a verdict of guilty is returned, the court, on
motion of the defendant, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal if the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a conviction of the offense. The test applied when reviewing the trial
court's ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is to determine whether the evidence was
6

sufficient to sustain a conviction of the crime charged. State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904, 912-13,
908 P.2d 1211, 1219-20 (1995).

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence where a

judgment of conviction has been entered upon a jury verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support
the jury's guilty verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099,
1101 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App.
1991 ). We do not substitute our view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the
weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684,
701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121
Idaho at 104, 822 P .2d at I 00 I.
To prove lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen, the state must prove that the
defendant engaged in "any lewd or lascivious act or acts," which includes manual-genital
contact, and that such was "done with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust
or passions or sexual desires of such person, such minor child, or third party." LC. § 18-1508.
Crawford argues that the only evidence supporting a finding that there was manual-genital
contact between him and Victim II was her testimony.

However, Crawford contends that

Victim II did not directly testify that he touched her genitals. During direct examination by the
state, Victim II testified as follows:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

Okay. And so let's go back to the touching. Besides touching when he was
rubbing your leg, was he getting close to where your underwear was at?
Yes.
In fact, was he up there to your privates?
Yes.
And so do you remember a time when you were in the kitchen with your
dad?
Yes.
Can you kind of tell the jurors a little bit about when that was.
When it was?
About how old you were.
I was in 8th grade ....
Okay. So what were you doing in the kitchen?
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A:

He was offering me an alcoholic drink and I had told him that I didn't want
any alcohol. And I don't know how the conversation got brought up, but he
asked me what a clit was and I told him that I didn't know what that was.

Q: And then what did he do?
A: He said, "Well, let me show you," and then went to go show me, and I, like,
backed away when he was going to show me.
Q: Okay. So did his hands touch you?
A: Yeah.
Q: Where did they touch you?
A: Outside ofmy vaginal area.
Q: Okay. So was he going down, like down from your shorts or was he going
up?
A: Up.
(Emphasis added.)

According to Crawford, the statement that he touched "outside of [her]

vaginal area" can only be interpreted to mean that Crawford had not touched Victim II's
genitalia, but had instead touched outside of her genital area.
We disagree. Victim H's statement that Crawford touched her "outside of [her] vaginal
area" does not demand a conclusion that Crawford did not engage in manual-genital contact. It
is the province of the jury to determine what the witness meant by the ambiguous phrase "outside
of [her] vaginal area," and we will not substitute our view for that of the jury as to the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104,822 P.2d at 1001; Decker,
108 Idaho at 684, 701 P.2d at 304.
Substantial evidence may exist even when the evidence presented is solely circumstantial
or when there is conflicting evidence. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,712,215 P.3d 414,432
(2009); State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 50-51, 454 P.2d 945, 947-48 (1969).

Even when

circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently with a finding of innocence, it will be
sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt.

Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432; State v. Slawson, 124 Idaho 753, 757, 864 P.2d
199,203 (Ct. App. 1993).
Such is the case here. The jury could have reasonably interpreted Victim H's statement
that Crawford touched her "outside of [her] vaginal area" to mean, among other things, that
Crawford had touched the external genitalia outside of her vagina or touched the area
surrounding her genitalia (as Crawford proposes). As noted by the district com1, the jury had the
opportunity to observe Victim II's demeanor as she testified and take note of her reluctance to
describe what happened to her. Moreover, not only did Victim II testify that Crawford touched
8

her "outside of [her] vaginal area," but she also responded affirmatively to the question that he
was "up there to [her] privates." This response was given without reference to any specific
event. However, it did follow a discussion regarding prior touching of Victim II's upper thigh
that had made her uncomfortable and immediately preceded the discussion of the incident in the
kitchen comprising Count II. Moreover, the kitchen incident is the only incident to which an
assertion that Crawford had touched "up there to [Victim II' s] privates" would logically
correlate, as all other incidents to which she testified involved him touching her "upper thigh,"
"close to [her] private area," or "outside of [her] bikini line." A jury could have reasonably
understood this affirmation by Victim II that Crawford had touched "up there to [her] privates"
as referencing the single count for which the state was arguing that such manual-genital contact
had occurred. Thus, the circumstantial evidence in the record, although subject to differing
interpretations, supports a reasonable inference of guilt consistent with the jury's verdict.
Accordingly, we hold that there was substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of
fact could have found that the essential elements of lewd conduct with a minor child under
sixteen, including manual-genital contact, were proven beyond a reasonable doubt in this case.
As a result, a motion to acquit by Crawford's trial counsel would have properly been denied, so
the tactical decision to not make such a motion did not constitute ineffective assistance.
B.

Sufficiency of the Evidence on Appeal

Crawford also argues that it was error for his appellate counsel to not raise the issue of
insufficient evidence of manual-genital contact on appeal.

However, this claim would have

failed on appeal for the same reasons it would have failed at trial, as already discussed.
Appellate counsel is not ineffective for choosing not to raise weak issues that are likely to be
denied. See Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[T]he
process of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on those more likely to
prevail, far from being the evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate
advocacy.") Accordingly, Crawford's appellate counsel was not ineffective for not raising the
issue of sufficiency of the evidence as to Count II on appeal.
C.

Response to Jury Question

Crawford contends that his trial counsel also provided ineffective assistance by failing to
request that the district court define "genital" or give an affirmative answer to a jury question of
whether touching the "vaginal area" was required for manual-genital contact under the statute.
9

In general, it is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether, and the manner in which,
to respond to a question posed by the jury during deliberations. l.C.R. 30(c); State v. Sheahan,
139 Idaho 267, 282, 77 P.3d 956, 971 (2003); State v. Pinkney, 115 Idaho 1152, l 154, 772 P.2d
1246, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). This grant of discretion is premised on the assumption that the
instructions as given are clear, direct, and proper statements of the law. Pinkney, 115 Idaho at
1154, 772 P.2d at 1248. Consequently, if a jury expresses doubt or confusion on a point of law
correctly and adequately covered in a given instruction, the trial court in its discretion may
explain the given instruction or further instruct the jury, but it is under no duty to do so. Id.
However, if a jury makes explicit its difficulties with a point of law pertinent to the case, thereby
revealing a defect, ambiguity or gap in the instructions, then the trial court has the duty to give
such additional instructions on the law as are reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt
or confusion. Id.; see also LC. §§ 19-2132(a) and 19-2204 (providing that a trial court must
instruct the jury on all matters of law necessary for their information).
Here, the jury was instructed that, in order to find Crawford guilty of lewd conduct as
charged in Count II, the jury had to find that the state proved Crawford committed an act of
manual-genital contact upon or with the body of Victim IL The jury instructions did not define
"genital." During deliberations, the jury asked several questions, including the question at issue
here: "In order to have committed manual-genital contact, does it require touching the vaginal
area? Does touching of the breast-area constitute manual-genital contact?" Crawford's counsel
indicated that he believed the answer was "no." The district court stated, "No, the answer is
reread the instructions. I'm not going to define for them manual-genital contact." The state
agreed with the district court. The district court concluded:
Well, if the jury--I do not feel comfortable defining, and, in fact, there's
case law that says not only should you default to the standard instructions, but that
while--while it may seem--it's tempting to want to define every single word, that
it's inappropriate for the court to do so and that the jurors have to apply their
understanding--their common ordinary understanding to it. And, therefore, I'm
just going to tell them to reread the instructions.
Crawford argues that it was objectively deficient performance for his trial counsel not to
either request that the district court define "genital" or provide an affirmative response to the first
sentence of the jury's question. Crawford also argues that, had trial counsel made such a request,
the issue would have been preserved for appeal, and the district court's decision would have been
reversed on appeal. However, this claim relies on Crawford's assertion that "vaginal area" is
10

synonymous with "genital" as used in LC. § 18-1508. This is incorrect. The jury was properly
instructed as to the elements of the crime charged in Count II that they were required to find
beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury's question of whether touching the "vaginal area" was
required for manual-genital contact does not indicate difficulties or confusion as to the law that
could not be adequately resolved by the instructions given: the state had to prove manual-genital
contact, not "vaginal area" contact. 4 Thus, the district court had discretion on whether and in
what manner to instruct the jury further regarding its question.
The district court opted to instruct the jury to "reread the jury instructions," leaving to the
jury the decision of whether the evidence, as presented, sufficed to constitute manual-genital
contact as charged in Count IL As noted by the district court in its summary dismissal, terms
which are of common usage and are generally understood need not be further defined when
instructing the jury. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 589, 261 P.3d 853, 866 (2011); State v.

Caldwell, 140 Idaho 740, 742, 101 P.3d 233, 235 (Ct. App. 2004). Crawford concedes that the
common understanding of the term "genital" usually refers to the external genitalia, including the
labia and clitoris, but also includes the internal sex organs, such as the vagina, cervix, and uterus.

See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 946 (1993) (defining "genitalia"
as "the organs of the reproductive system; esp: the external genital organs"). Thus, the trial
court did not err by not defining "genital" further for the jury, and the decision by Crawford's
trial counsel not to request that the trial court do so did not constitute ineffective assistance.
Additionally, as noted by the district court and previously discussed, an affirmative
answer to the jury's question would have been inaccurate and may have confused the jury, as the
"vaginal area" and "genitals" are not necessarily synonymous. Although touching the vaginal
area is sufficient, it does not solely constitute manual-genital contact under LC. § 18-1508.
Moreover, the state bore the burden of proving manual-genital contact, not "vaginal area"
contact, so an instruction that touching the vaginal area was required would have been erroneous.
As a result, Crawford's trial counsel was not ineffective for not requesting that the trial court
provide a definition of the commonly understood term "genital" or provide an inaccurate
affirmative response to the jury question, as those requests would have been properly denied.

4

Our prior decision on direct appeal principally concerned the question relating to
touching the breast area, which was factually involved in Count I, but not Count IT.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
Crawford has failed to show that his trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel as a matter of law, as there was substantial evidence to support the jury's
verdict and Crawford's proposed response to the jury's question was an inaccurate statement of
law.

Accordingly, the district court's summary dismissal of Crawford's petition for post-

conviction relief is affirmed. No costs or attorney fees are awarded on appeal.
Judge GRATTON, CONCURS.
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ, DISSENTING
Because I conclude that Crawford has demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel, the
district court's grant of the State's motion for summary dismissal should be reversed and the
district court's denial of Crawford's cross-motion for summary disposition should be reversed.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

A.

Sufficiency of the Evidence
Important to today's post-conviction appeal is Victim II's testimony at the criminal trial. 1

Rather than beginning with the incident at issue in Count II--the underlying count for this postconviction appeal--the prosecutor began with general questions about Crawford's touching of
Victim II. Specifically, Victim II testified that before she was thirteen (2006 or earlier) and after
she was thirteen (2006 and later), she was touched by Crawford and that she became
uncomfortable with Crawford's touching at around age thirteen.

Victim II explained that

Crawford would touch her "on [her] upper thigh," and "[c]lose to [her] private area." Crawford,

The facts in this case arise from a single trial, with three counts of alleged crimes
involving Victim II (Counts II-IV). Relevant to this appeal, Count II of the information, based
on the district court's oration, alleged that on or between 2007 and 2008 in the state of Idaho,
Crawford committed an act of manual-genital contact upon or with the body of Victim II, and
that Crawford committed the act with the specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust or
passions or sexual desires of Crawford, Victim II, or another person.
In closing argument, the prosecutor clarified that Count II related to an incident in the
kitchen in which Crawford asked Victim II if she knew what a clitoris was. The prosecutor also
clarified what Counts Ill and IV referred to. Count III referred to an event around Christmas
2008 in which Crawford exposed his penis. Count IV referred to when Crawford grabbed
Victim II's breast and also "when he's rubbing up toward her panty line getting closer and
closer."
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according to Victim II, was getting close to where her underwear was at, and in fact was up there
to her privates.
After eliciting this general testimony from Victim II, the prosecutor moved on and
proceeded to ask Victim II about the kitchen incident, the subject of Count II.

Victim II

explained that she was in the kitchen at her home and was wearing pajama shorts and a tank top.
According to Victim II, Crawford offered her alcohol, which she refused, but during the
discussion in the kitchen, Crawford asked Victim II if she knew what a "clit" (clitoris) was.
After she responded that she did not know what a clitoris was, Victim II explained Crawford's
actions:
[Victim II]:
[The prosecutor]:
[Victim II]:
[The prosecutor]:
[Victim II]:
[The prosecutor]:
[Victim II]:
[The prosecutor]:
[Victim II]:

He said, "Well, let me show you," and then went to go show me,
and I, like, backed away when he was going to show me.
Okay. So did his hands touch you?
Yeah.
Where did they touch you?
Outside of my vaginal area.
Okay. So was he going down, like down from your shorts or was
he going up?
Up.
Did you -- did you make any comments to him?
I just told him that I was going to bed and I went upstairs and just
went straight to bed.

Following Victim II's testimony regarding the kitchen incident, the prosecutor moved on
to another incident that occurred while Victim II and Crawford were watching television. 2 This
incident was offered with regard to Count IV, as best can be gleaned from the closing argument.
In her testimony, Victim II explained that Crawford and she would be on the couch, that
Crawford would pull a blanket out and put it over the two of them, and that Crawford would start
rubbing her upper thigh. She clarified that Crawford would begin at the knee area and move
upward, toward her "privates" and just "outside of [her] bikini line." The prosecutor, while
questioning about this incident, also asked, "At some point did you remove his hand from around
your vaginal area or from near your vaginal area?" Victim II said, "Yeah."
The prosecutor then shifted gears to an incident in December 2008, near Christmas, that
was the basis for Count III. During this December 2008 incident, Crawford showed Victim II his
2

Although the prosecutor asked Victim II to "describe for us an incident when you were
about 13 and watching TV," Victim ll's answers allude to multiple times in which Crawford
pulled the blanket over himself and Victim II, and implicate that Crawford touched her on
multiple occasions.
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penis and asked her to look at it. Following Victim II's testimony, the prosecutor went on to
another incident at a television sports party in which Crawford, in front of guests, grabbed
Victim II's left breast (presumably, over her clothing) and exclaimed, in a joking manner
according to Victim II, that she was "growing boobs." This incident, like the television incident,
was also offered in support of Count IV, based upon the prosecutor's closing argument. The last
incident brought out by the prosecutor also was in support of Count IV. In the last incident,
Victim II explained that she was talking to her grandfather on the phone when Crawford started
rubbing her stomach and started moving his hand toward her breasts, before she pushed his
hands away.
The crux of this appeal, as it relates to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, turns
on whether Victim II's testimony concerning Count II about Crawford touching her outside her
vaginal area refers to touching Victim II's genitalia. Victim II's testimony is problematic in this
case because Victim II's testimony about being touched outside the vaginal area does not clarify
whether Crawford touched her genitalia or touched her outside of the genitalia. The phrase
vaginal area is ambiguous; this Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have used the phrase to refer
to the genital area, but the courts have also used the phrase more specifically to refer to the area
around the vaginal orifice. Compare, e.g., State v. Cardell, 132 Idaho 217, 220, 970 P.2d 10, 13
(1998) (interchanging vaginal area with genitalia), and State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 649 84
P.3d 579, 585 (Ct. App. 2004) (equating vaginal area with genital area), with State v. Lewis, 96
Idaho 743, 745, 536 P.2d 738, 740 (1975) (describing a doctor's testimony in which the doctor
explained that he found no evidence of tom or bruised tissue in the vaginal area, presumably
referring to the specific area around the vaginal orifice), and State v. Durst, 126 Idaho 140, 143,
879 P.2d 603, 606 (Ct. App. 1994) (discussing a physician's testimony in which "[h]e testified
that in his opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the victim's injuries were caused
by a forced entry of the vaginal area by penile penetration."). Similarly, the courts have used the
term vagina where, in context, the proper term should be external genitalia.

E.g., State v.

Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 687, 273 P.3d 1271, 1280 (2012) (paraphrasing the victim's testimony
to explain that "Pepcom placed his hand on her thigh then slowly moved it up to her vagina and
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let it rest there as she rode in front of him on four-wheeler rides."). The vagina is, in fact, an
internal genital, 3 but genitalia also includes the external genitals, namely the vulva. 4
In considering Victim II's testimony, the majority opinion errs by using Victim II's
general testimony about Crawford's touching throughout the years in support of Victim II's
statements about the kitchen incident.

Specifically, the majority relies upon Victim II

acknowledging that throughout the years, Crawford would touch her on her upper thigh, close to
her private area, close to where her underwear was at, and up to her privates. But Victim II's
testimony about Crawford's actions throughout the years did not state that Crawford specifically
touched her this way during the kitchen incident. More importantly, even though Crawford may
have touched Victim II close to her genitalia throughout the years, the general testimony did not
state that Crawford actually touched any part of her genitalia.
The majority also attempts to support its use of the general testimony about the touching
by contending that "the kitchen incident is the only incident to which an assertion that Crawford
had touched 'up there to [Victim II's] privates' would logically correlate." This contention is
incorrect. In her testimony about the television and blanket incident ( or incidents), Victim II
acknowledged that she removed Crawford's hand "from around [her] vaginal area or from near
[her] vaginal area," but this testimony related to another incident and count.
In fact, the testimony about Crawford's touching throughout the years is far too general
to relate to any specific incident; Count II, as clarified by the prosecutor, only focuses on the
kitchen incident. Besides the fact that Victim II's testimony is too general to relate to any
specific incident, it would still be unreasonable for a jury to draw an inference that Crawford
actually touched Victim II's genitalia during the kitchen incident, because Victim II never
indicated that Crawford actually touched her genitalia in her general testimony about Crawford's
actions throughout the years.
Although unaddressed by the majority opinion, there was testimony at the criminal trial
that clarifies what Victim II was referring to in the kitchen incident. A sex crimes investigator

3

The vagina is "a canal that leads from the uterus of a female mammal to the external
orifice of the genital canal." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2528 (1993).
4

The vulva is "the external parts of the female genital organs." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2567 ( 1993).
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with the Meridian Police Department interviewed Victim IL During his testimony, he explained
what Victim II told him in regard to the kitchen incident:
[The prosecutor]:

[The investigator]:
[The prosecutor]:
[The investigator]:

And did [Victim II] tell you what her response was when she
indicated that [Crawford] had made a quick move toward her to
show her what a clit was?
Yes, she had indicated that he had reached his hand up the pants
leg of her shorts.
Okay.
He was trying to get her -- get his hand inside of her underwear
and she stepped away from him and told him no.

The investigator's testimony is consistent with Victim II's testimony that she "backed away
when he was going to show me" what a clitoris was. However, Victim II indicated to the
investigator that Crawford tried to get his hand inside of her underwear (presumably trying to
make contact with her genitalia). The reasonable inference drawn from Victim II's and the
investigator's testimony is that Crawford was attempting to touch the genital area under
Victim II's underwear, but touched Victim II outside of her genital area and did not touch her
external genitalia.
Taken together, the evidence and all reasonable inferences do not lead to the conclusion
that Crawford touched Victim II's genitalia during the kitchen incident; rather, the evidence and
inferences lead to the opposite conclusion. For this reason, I would hold that defense counsel
provided deficient performance by failing to move for judgment of acquittal, as it would have
been objectively reasonable to make such a motion. I would also conclude that appellate counsel
provided deficient performance by failing to raise the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, as this
issue was clearly stronger than the issues presented in the first appeal. Prejudice is shown in
both instances because a favorable ruling would have led to Crawford being acquitted of
Count II.
B.

Response to the Jury Question

Finally, Crawford asserts that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to request that the court define genital in response to part of a jury question or provide
an affirmative response to the first part of the same jury question. During jury deliberations, the
jury asked the court a two-part question, which stated, "In order to have committed manualgenital contact, does it require touching the vaginal area? Does touching of the breast area
constitute manual-genital contact?" Crawford's defense counsel recommended a single answer,
saying, "No." The court responded, ·'No, the answer is reread the instructions. I'm not going to
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define for them manual-genital." The court then referred to the prosecutor, and the prosecutor
expressed her view that the jury asked a two-part question:

"I think they have a two-part

question, does it include the vaginal area and does it [ ] include breast. So, I mean, how can you
say no?" Following the prosecutor's remarks, the court decided that it would instruct the jury to
reread the instructions.
The majority concludes that the jury's question "does not indicate difficulties or
confusion as to the law that could not be adequately resolved by the instructions given." I
disagree; so, too, did the panel on direct appeal. State v. Crawford, Docket No. 38787 at 3 (Ct.
App. June 27, 2012) ("By asking, 'In order to have committed manual-genital contact, does it
require touching the vaginal area? Does touching of the breast-area constitute manual-genital
contact?' the jury expressed doubt or confusion on a point of law not adequately covered in the
jury instructions and pertinent to this case, thereby revealing a defect, ambiguity, or gap in the
instructions. Thus, the district court had the duty to give additional instructions on the law
reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt or confusion."). As this Court explained in the
prior unpublished opinion, in general, it is within the trial court's discretion to determine
whether, and the manner in which, to respond to a question posed by the jury during
deliberations. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 282, 77 P.3d 956, 971 (2003). This grant of
discretion is premised on the assumption that the instructions as given are clear, direct, and
proper statements of the law. Id. Consequently, if a jury expresses doubt or confusion on a point
of law correctly and adequately covered in a given instruction, the trial court in its discretion
may explain the given instruction or further instruct the jury, but it is under no duty to do so. Id.
However, if a jury makes explicit its difficulties with a point of law pertinent to the case, thereby
revealing a defect, ambiguity or gap in the instructions, then the trial court has the duty to give
such additional instructions on the law as are reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt
or confusion. Id. Under this reasoning, we held in the direct appeal that the district court had the
duty to give additional instructions on the law reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt
or confusion concerning manual-genital contact. See Crawford, Docket No. 38787 at 3.
The last issue raised by Crawford in this appeal, though, is not whether the district court
erred when it failed to give clarifying instructions, but whether counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel. I would hold that it was objectively unreasonable for defense counsel not
to

request that the comi otherwise clarify the law to alleviate the jury's doubt or confusion. Had
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defense counsel requested the court to otherwise clarify the law to alleviate the jury's doubt or
confusion, and the court given the instruction, there is a reasonable probability that Crawford
would have been acquitted by the jury.
In summary, the district court erred by granting the State's motion for summary
dismissal. As for Crawford's cross-motion for summary disposition, there is no genuine issue of
material fact, and Crawford is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the three
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; accordingly, the district court erred by denying
Crawford's cross-motion for summary disposition.
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